
























ISSN 1231 – 1413
1 173 11( )’
BOOK REVIEWS
Jakob Arnoldi, Risk. An Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009, pp. 216
ISBN: 978-0-7456-4099-0
Keywords: risk; risk government; uncertainty; experts; technology assessment.
The Paradoxes of Risk
‘In reality, our world has become one big laboratory,’ writes Jakob Arnoldi in the
conclusion of his book entitled Risk. An Introduction, thus summarising the nature
and role of risk in the modern world. While this is not a new claim (cf. Krohn, Weyer
1989, Beck 1988), it draws attention to the importance of potential threats associated
with developments in science and technology (S&T) for the functioning of modern
societies. Arnoldi then elaborates on that point (p. 181) by saying: ‘The real tests are
carried out not in the laboratories but in the ecosystem, and no one can know the
outcomes because new technologies are introduced faster than possible effects of the
old can be scientifically established.’
Throughout a large part of the book, Arnoldi provides justification of that state-
ment. While his work is avowedly a concise introduction into sociological thinking
on risk, it does not shun claims or analysis of problematic issues. The author has
managed to reconcile contradictions in at least a few respects. Despite its modest
size, the book is by no means cursory. While the author attempts to give justice to
a large array of concepts, stances and theories on risk, he offers in-depth discussion
which is carefully thought-out, without unnecessary verbosity. And, finally, despite
its course-book style, Arnoldi’s work does not only summarise various theories and
concepts but also attempts to evaluate them and engage into constructive discussion.
Technology-Related Risk and Social Risk
Let us briefly reconstruct the picture of the field, i.e. Arnoldi’s depiction of reflection
on risk. At the outset, he makes an important distinction between technology-related
risk and social risk. The former occurs when we deal with consequences of certain
technologies or of S&T progress at large (those are the so-called ‘side effects’, such
as ozone depletion caused by the use of freon, global warming resulting from high
carbon emissions or diseases caused by smoking). The recent disaster in the Gulf of
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Mexico which resulted in a giant oil spill into the ocean can serve as an admonitory
example of this kind of risk.
‘Social risk’ is a more metaphoric notion, referring to lifestyles in the developing
modern society, and associated with the processes of individualisation. This approach
to risk draws attention to the fact that individual lives are saturated with high-risk de-
cisions, entailing individual responsibility in the case of failure. In neo-liberal systems,
the prevalent attitude based on maxims such as ‘everyone is the maker of their own
fortune’ or ‘you needs to take your life in your own hands’ burdens individuals with
the responsibility for success and the risk of failure. Meanwhile, risk-taking becomes
an element of a social attitude which is being promoted. Social risk is noticeable in
spheres such as career, education, family, social insurance or throughout the course
of an individual’s life.
In his work, Arnoldi takes account of both those understandings of risk,
technology-based and social, yet it gives more attention to the former, which seems
in line with the proportions of available research on risk. As he points out at the
outset, the separation of technology-based risk from social risk does not mean that
the former is purely physical. On the contrary, both types of risk are social in their
nature, as risk often represents a social and political problem (for instance, global
warming or smog in cities), thus being addressed by specific social institutions such as,
e.g., insurance companies or regulators. Risk, however, is social also in the epistemo-
logical and ontological dimension: the cognitive frames in the community determine
whether and how risk occurs and becomes targeted by specific social actions. We
fear certain types of risk more than others, willing to accept some but not other
types. We consider some risks to be irremovable but try to eliminate others. We
are afraid of plane crashes and terrorist attacks yet we fearlessly get behind the
wheel of our cars, one of the most lethal weapon out there. We believe that air
pollution is the price to pay for the growth of the automotive industry but reject
traditional electric bulbs in fear of global warming and climate change. We fight
obesity and excess weight, without worrying much about artificial additives in our
foods.
Transformations of Risk in the Modern Era
Arnoldi examines institutional practices addressing risk as well as socio-cultural filters
in the perception of risk. He is interested in risk as a phenomenon, or an aspect of S&T
developments, but also as a notion used by social systems in their practices. Going
back to David Hume’s ideas, Arnoldi shows how the notion of risk spread within
the modern culture. A turning point occurred when risk was turned into an object
of scientific investigation, and harnessed by probability calculus: from that moment,
symbolic for the early days of modernity, risk ceased to be a stroke of fortune or
of supernatural powers, an unexpected misfortune or divine retribution but, instead,
became a calculable, predictable, preventable and controlled phenomenon. The idea
of risk as the likelihood of certain losses opened the way to risk calculation and
incorporation of risk in planned actions.
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Drawing mostly on Ulrich Beck’s concept of ‘risk society’ Arnoldi focuses on the
turn which took place in the second half of the 20th century in the sphere of risk and
its perception in Western societies. Following Beck, Arnoldi assumes the risk which
accompanied existing technologies as an unwelcome yet marginal side effect, began to
expand in recent decades, becoming a dominant factor in S&T. Risk became a mighty
force which can no longer be neglected as an inevitable ‘cost of progress’. This new
nature of risk is rooted in a number of factors:
— An increasing scale of potential threats caused by the development of new tech-
nologies. In fact, it was not just the nuclear bomb that was a turning point but
also the discovery, in late 1960s, of the delayed effects of nuclear explosions in Hi-
roshima and Nagasaki (cf. Scheer 1987). Developments in nuclear power in 1960s
and 1970s, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, and the Chernobyl disaster are
the milestones marking the increasing role of risk in societies. At the same time,
they clearly demonstrate the role of the social frames of risk perception in this
process (the environmental movements and the Cold War played a considerable
role here).
— An increasing scope of non-technological consequences of risk. The undesirable
effects increasingly penetrate various fields of social life, entangling political, cul-
tural, ethical and economic phenomena into Latour’s hybrid actor-network, where
the social can no longer be distinguished from the natural. The risk associated with
the use of biotechnology in food production, medicine and industry is not just the
problem of potential harms to consumer health or to the ecosystem, but also the
problem of consequences for food production chains, the global balance of power
between the North and the South, the prevailing notions of human life and body,
ethics and religious ideas.
— Unpredictability of potential effects of technological developments which render
the classic probability calculus useless. If we are unable to determine long-term
effects of biotechnology in agriculture, there is no way to predict the likelihood
of their occurrence and calculate the risk. Meanwhile, regarding the two points
above, many technologies may have undesirable consequences we are unable to
predict. For instance, for many decades people did not know how the use of freon
as a cooling gas might be related to ozone depletion or how asbestos may be
linked to lung cancer. Likewise, we do not know today whether and what kinds of
consequences may ensue as a result of electromagnetic radiation in mobile tele-
phones. The relationship between carbon emissions and global warming remains
controversial whereas the effects of nanotechnology in medicine belong to the
sphere of utter speculation. Closer to home, it is enough to invoke the common
examples of side effects caused by drugs with a marketing authorisation, revealed
only after some time, leading to drug recalls.
Sociologists Speak of Rrisk
Considering those transformations within the characteristics of risk, Beck speaks
of the advent of a new type of risk, which he juxtaposes with risks typically found
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in the industrial era. The main characteristics include the fact that such risk has
no external origin (as was the case with natural disasters) but is a product of the
modern system based on rapid S&T progress. With that new type of risk a new
social order emerges, based on distribution risk rather than the distribution of goods.
Meanwhile, we see new types of socio-political conflicts, focused on the distribution
of risks.
Apart from Beck’s ideas, Arnoldi also discusses the cultural theory of risk de-
veloped by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildawsky and Foucault’s governmentality per-
spective. Unlike the German sociologist, those authors are less interested in the phe-
nomenon of risk and its transformation, paying more attention to the notion of risk
and its functions in institutional practice. In their analyses, Douglas and Wildawsky
focus on how the perceptions of risk by social groups depend on the prevailing clas-
sification systems and normative systems which, in turn, they saw as embedded in
organisational structures of groups. The best-known element of their theory is the
grid-group analysis, which refers to two variables: degree of autonomy and degree
of incorporation. In order to illustrate the differences in risk perception dependent
on those variables, they proposed four ideal types of structures: bureaucratic, indi-
vidualistic, sectarian organisations and the excluded. While the theory developed by
Douglas and Wildawsky is highly relativist, its authors making no attempts to hide their
reluctance towards environmental movements, which they accuse of spreading panic
and putting exaggerated emphasis on risk (apparently resulting from the structure of
those movements), their theory does not challenge the existence or the importance of
risk as an objective phenomenon. Constructivism invoked by those authors only plays
an epistemological role, without touching the ontological level.
The notion of governmentality is used in the context of risk by Francois Ewald,
Nikolas Rose or Ian Hacking. Those scholars are interested in risk as a kind of ‘inde-
pendent variable’: they do not deal with risk itself and matters such as, e.g., current
environmental problems but, instead, they look at how risk is used in governance of
social groups. Those authors identify the existence of new regimes (governance sys-
tems) based on dispersed power, embedded mostly in scientific practices. Examples
include vital statistics and statistics referring to income, housing conditions and family
relations, health and hygiene, providing grounds for governing the society. Knowl-
edge about risk plays a key role here, allowing decision makers to plan policies for
the community concerned.
Further on, Arnoldi briefly presents other contemporary theories of risk by Niklas
Luhmann, Anthony Giddens and those developed within the Actor-Network Theory
(ANT) and Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF). The second part of the
book brings an overview of specific issues within the field of social studies on risk, such
as environmental problems, risk assessment, the role of scientific research, cultural
frameworks of risk, risk and the media, individual risk-taking in the consumer industry
or risk as an element of politics and power. It is important to note that subsequent
chapters are visibly interconnected: the theoretical notions presented in the first part
are employed later on, empirical issues are elucidated from various perspectives, and
various problems are shown as intertwined.
BOOK REVIEWS 123
Three Paradoxes of Risk
A reader of Arnoldi’s book is left with the impression that risks in the modern
world are paradoxical in nature. Before attempting to indicate various aspects of this
paradoxical nature, let us look at the diagnosis which the author formulates towards
the end of the chapter on the history of risk. He points out that we are dealing with the
crisis of the idea of risk, whereby potential threats ‘are calculable and manageable and
that such calculation and management are beneficial’ (p. 36). Arnoldi invokes Frank
Knight’s analytical distinction into uncertainty and risk: the former is incalculable and
impenetrable whereas the latter is calculable and cognizable. Based on this distinction,
Arnoldi argues that ‘there is now more uncertainty and less risk’ (p. 36).
Taking this diagnosis as a point of departure, we can formulate at least three
paradoxes of risk which can be found (sometimes, alas, only implicitly) in Arnoldi’s
book. The first paradox refers to the origins of risk typically found in the modern era.
The notion of risk originates from attempts to harness and control uncertainty related
to threats faced by societies and individuals. Following F. Ewald, Arnoldi shows that
risk is no longer perceived as external (‘natural’) and unpredictable in the modern
era but becomes calculable and predictable thanks to developments in mathematics
and science, probability calculus and statistical tools. In a sense, risk can be ‘tamed’.
This internalisation of potential threats by social systems means that risk ceases to
be a natural phenomenon and becomes a social problem to be managed. In this way,
risk becomes separate from uncertainty (following the aforementioned distinction
introduced by Knight).
Based on the modernist ideal whereby humans could find emancipation from the
power of blind natural forces, attempts to control threats were expected to free hu-
mans from uncertainty and fate and, as a result, to ensure universal safety in modern
societies. Paradoxically, as pointed out by Beck, that internalisation of risk, intended
to control it, did not improve global safety but achieved quite the opposite: escalation
of risk. Although we live longer, healthier and more pleasant lives, the number of
potential threats around us has not shrunk. It is just their nature that has changed.
As implementation of safety-boosting strategies progressed (e.g. people ventured to
control potentially threatening spheres of nature, by regulating rivers or forecast-
ing weather, to improve social security through social insurance, to rationalise new
spheres of social life in order to predict their dynamics and directions of develop-
ment) the scale and nature of side effects grew. At some point they stopped to play
a marginal role and led to the emergence of a ‘risk society’.
The second paradox is, in a sense, a follow-up of the former and involves a kind
of regression of risk which, again began to emerge as an uncertainty typical of the
preindustrial era. On the one hand, as mentioned earlier, risk begins to escape the
classic probability calculus, which means that people lose hope for being able to
control risks. Science, which was expected to free mankind from uncertainty and
unpredictable natural threats, turned out to generate new risks without being able
to handle them. The role of science in itself is paradoxical, in three senses. Arnoldi
writes (pp. 86–87):
124 BOOK REVIEWS
First, without science no one would have any knowledge of a broad range of risks and the technologies
causing risks would not have come into existence. Second, public concerns about risks are often accompa-
nied by distrust of scientific assurance that the technologies are safe, and yet public concerns are in many
cases based on scientific findings. Third, science seems to produce as much uncertainty as certainty.
On the other hand, the effects of nature on the lives of societies have not been
entirely harnessed. As illustrated by the most recent case of paralysed air traffic in
Europe due to an entirely ‘normal’ volcano eruption in Iceland, we are still far from
liberating ourselves from natural disasters. Considering those two aspects, we might
say that the modernist risk management project has failed: not all uncertainties have
been transformed into calculable risks and, moreover, new types of ‘manufactured
uncertainties’ (to use Giddens’ words) have emerged, escaping scientific assessment.
This diagnosis seems to confirm the message expressed by Bruno Latour in the title
of his acclaimed work: We Have Never Been Modern (Latour 1993).
The third paradox results, in a sense, from the previous two: despite the failure of
the modernist project based on risk assessment and management, Western societies
continue to rely on risk assessment devices based on the classic understanding of risk.
The risk assessment and technology assessment1 institutions, emerging since 1970s,
play an advisory role to political authorities and use the classic idea of risk in their
assessment of new technologies, trying to determine the likelihood of certain losses.
This paradox is pointed out by Arnoldi, who writes:
[A]ll sorts of risk expertise are applied in all sectors of society at the same time that such practices and
forms of knowledge are being questioned. (…). In other words, when faced with new uncertainties, most
Western countries have responded with more risk assessment. Risk thus becomes an even more important
concept when uncertainty emerges as a concern.
This process seems to be rooted in a more fundamental paradox related to the
situation of science as such, as it plays a key role in the contemporary risk man-
agement. As Beck observes, we are dealing again with an entire series of paradoxes
(p. 88): science today is a source of and a solution to risk-related problems; it is
constantly confronted with its own products, forcing science to produce a specific
type of reflexivity.2 At the same time, science remains the only tool at the disposal of
modern societies in order to both diagnose and prevent risks. However, as risks are
evolving back into uncertainties, science is an increasingly unreliable tool. As Beck
argues (pp. 89–90), risk assessment procedures turn out to be inadequate at present
time for the following and other reasons:
— short-term lab tests are unable to reflect the complexity of the environment and
all the potential interactions that the new technologies may enter into (as an
example, we can think of genetically modified plants and animals introduced to
ecosystems);
1 As examples, we can mention the Office of Technology Assessment established in 1972 at the
U.S. Congress, the Büro für Technikfolgenabschätzung at Germany’s Bundestag, the Danish Board of
Technology or the European Parliamentary Technology Assessment network.
2 Beck, who developed the idea of ‘reflexive modernisation’ with Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash
(Beck, Giddens, Lash 1994), speaks about reflexivity in the sense of going back in order to describe
a situation where modern societies have to go back to their own products to prevent crisis.
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— extrapolation of previous findings onto future behaviours of the system becomes
increasingly flawed with uncertainty as systems are highly dynamic;
— statistical analysis of risks associated with the exposure of human bodies to harmful
substances is much above the levels of acceptable risks and unable to spot risk
before it crosses a threshold value;
— there is a visible contradiction between expert opinions delivered by scientists and,
as a result consensus is harder to reach;
— prevalence of the so-called zero-risk hypothesis which assumes non-existence of
risk (e.g. the relationship between electromagnetic radiation from mobile tele-
phones and brain tumours) and may be abandoned only when a high likelihood
of risk has been established.
An outcome of these paradoxes is that our societies become increasingly like
a ‘society as a laboratory’ rather than a ‘risk society’. This notion, alternative versus
that of Beck’s, was put forward in 1980s by German sociologists Wolfgang Krohn and
Johannes Weyer (Krohn, Weyer 1989). By looking at some of the above-mentioned
risk assessment characteristics, they observe that many contemporary technologies
have a singular characteristic: people are unable to predict their outcomes before
implementation. In those authors’ opinion, this is not a technical error caused by
mismanaged lab tests, and avoidable at a greater effort, but an inherent characteristic
of complex technology systems which, in view of their nature, cannot be sufficiently
tested under laboratory conditions. In that situation, the only way to test new tech-
nological solutions which address risk is to launch them and watch them work. One
example comes from military technology which is hardly testable on a training ground.
This is why it has been admitted that the decision to initiate some military conflicts
was largely driven by the desire to test new types of weapons.
While this might sound like conspiracy theory, Krohn and Weyer argue that the
notion of society as a laboratory is not only a metaphor; introduction of technolog-
ical innovations does have attributes of experimental production of new knowledge.
Technological innovations are ‘real-life experiments’3 where the function of potential
falsifiers is played by… accidents. Therefore, risk in that case is not just produced
and purposefully assumed but it is equivalent to the laboratory-like trial and error
methodology.
What’s Next for Risk?
The paradoxes and problems associated with the transformation of the nature of
threats in contemporary societies provoke a number of questions, both analytical and
practical. In the analytical dimension, one might wonder about the sense of further
use of the notion of risk. Even if we only consider the words quoted above, we are
not dealing with risk today in the same sense as it was understood throughout history.
When we are unable to determine the likelihood or the nature of potential damage,
how can we continue to talk about risk?
3 For ‘real-life experiments’, please refer to Krohn et. al. 2005.
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In this conceptual muddle, a considerable proportion of blame goes to Beck, who
introduced the notion of risk into the public debate, turning it into a cornerstone of
its ‘risk society’ theory. At the same time, his theory can be seen as fierce criticism of
that notion, focused on demonstrating that we are dealing with something different
in quality, i.e. with completely new types of threats. Arnoldi himself observes that
‘Beck is in fact writing more about uncertainty than about risk or dangers’ (p. 52).
Undoubtedly, some other notions would be more adequate than ‘risk’ in describ-
ing potential dangers in today’s world. Some authors have already suggested talking
about various degrees of ignorance, not just uncertainties (cf. Wehling 1996, Stock-
ing, Holstein 1993, Proctor, Schiebinger 2008, Stankiewicz 2008). In this context,
Brian Wynne distinguishes between risk, uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminacy
(Wynne 1992: 114):
—risk: occurs when the probability is known;
—uncertainty: the probability is unknown but key parameters may be known;
—ignorance: we do not know what we do not know;
—indeterminacy: open nature of cause-effect chains and networks.
Taking note of the ‘unknown unknowns’4 will allow us to spot the problematic
nature of the notion of risk based on probability and engineering-driven predictability.
Regretfully, Arnoldi does not seem to appreciate it, nor does he problematise the issue
of further use of the long-established notion of risk.
Analytical precision is not the only concern. Arguments in favour of abandoning
discussions on risk also have a practical dimension. The first argument might refer
to the third paradox: despite the inadequacy of the notion of risk, its persistent use
conserves the equally inadequate risk assessment system which still underlies the con-
trol and assessment of new technologies. In other words, the use of the notion of risk
supports the illusion that threats are controllable and predictable, and legitimises the
operation of an ineffective risk assessment system. When judging acceptability of new
technologies in the light of their ‘side effects’, the decisive vote still belongs to experts
in advisory bodies, expert committees and scientific boards. This, necessarily, makes
it more difficult for societies to face new threats generated by the modern civilisation
which are increasingly unrelated to risk, moving towards uncertainty, ignorance or
indeterminacy.
Another practical problem is that social controversies focused around new tech-
nologies are framed as ‘risk disputes’. Unacceptability of technological innovations
(or some of their aspects) apparently lies in lay risk assessment, which is differ-
ent from expert assessment, the former being erroneous and exaggerated. In the
report entitled Science and Governance. Taking European Knowledge Society Seri-
ously (2007) Ulrike Felt and Brian Wynne argue that this assumption obscures
the normative nature of risk and is based on an artificial separation of facts from
4 At this point it is worthwhile recalling words uttered by Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense:
‘There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. We also know there are known
unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—
the ones we don’t know we don’t know’ (quoted after Proctor 2008: 29).
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values. What worries people about new technologies is not just their potential
harmfulness but also the consequences for social life, neglected or unknown, and
the ability of social institutions to address them. This, one might add, stems di-
rectly from the third paradox and from the dominance of expert-based risk as-
sessment systems that leave little room for analysis of non-technological aspects of
risk.
Experimenting with Risk?
Another practical consequence of the perception of new technologies and their out-
comes as risks is that opportunities which, in fact, represent the reverse side of risk,
tend to be ignored. A focus on risks means that people mostly notice the undesir-
able consequences of certain technologies whereas, as indicated by the ‘side effects’
perspective, risk is a price paid for opportunities and hopes opened up by new tech-
nologies. If we talk about ‘risk society’, we might ignore this positive dimension of
technological developments. Many authors point out that contemporary Western so-
cieties are pervaded by risk aversion: we are no longer dealing only with a modernist
attempt at controlling risk (which assumes some degree of acceptance) but attempt
to uproot any uncertainty and threats from social life:
Fear of technological risks has been present in the Western world since the industrial revolution in the
19th century, and from this time onwards responses to technology seem to oscillate along the spectrum
of prohibition, prevention, precaution, foresight and blind euphoria. Following the triumphant belief in
scientific and technological progress of the 1950s and the related zenith in risk acceptance, the tide changed
in the late 1960s and reached its nadir in 1986 with the Chernobyl, River Rhine and Challenger disasters.
Public reluctance to accept certain key technologies maximized or even shifted towards outright ‘per
se opposition’. Today’s richest, long-lived, best-protected, most resourceful civilization is on its way to
becoming the most frightened and cultivates the vision of a zero-risk society. (Kirchsteiger 2005)
Attempts to build a ‘zero-risk society’ may be interpreted as linked to the first
paradox described above and seen as a result following from the collapse of the
modernist idea of risk assessment: if we are unable to control the side effects of
technological progress, or even to predict them, we attempt to eliminate those risks
from social life altogether. The problem of acceptability of risk, put forward in 1969 by
Chauncey Starr in his Science article with a meaningful title ‘How safe is safe enough?’
(Starr 1969), seemed to remain unsolvable for a long time. Today, the answer seems
straightforward: only 100 per cent safety is enough. This approach, however, means
that any innovative technologies may be rejected on those grounds and, when taken
to the extreme, the S&T progress may be paralysed.
Criticism of this trend in Western societies provides a point of departure for
fairly radical propositions formulated by authors such as Aaron Wildawsky (1988) or
Wolfgang van den Daele (1993). They suggest a pro-active risk policy, focusing not on
risk avoidance but on embracing it as an opportunity. In his 1988 book Searching for
Safety, Wildawsky directly calls for increasing the amount of risk in the social system
in order to maximise flexibility. This approach would be based on an assumption,
taken by Wildawsky from laboratory research, that more learning comes from errors
than from successful experiments. Likewise, societies could learn more from the
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implementation of various scenarios, however undesirable, than from elimination
of risks. Wildawsky’s suggestion evoked diverse criticism, focusing mostly on the
ethical dimension. Wildawsky himself does not neglect the problem and talks about
the need to introduce the ‘rule of sacrifice’ i.e. sacrificing part of the system in
order to improve the whole. Thus, if people decide to risk another Chernobyl, the
disaster will not be wasted experience and will contribute to improvements in nuclear
technology. What Wildawsky suggests, then, is nothing else but the very same real-life
experiments mentioned earlier. Regretfully, his arguments provoke concerns about
the society being treated as a laboratory in the face of new technologies. In short,
the consequences of errors may be much more grave than is the case with laboratory
errors, and may not be limited only to parts of the whole system. For instance,
the consequences of introducing biotechnology or nanotechnology on a mass scale
may significantly step outside the border of an experiment and, as such, become
irreversible.
In his theory, Wolfgang van den Daele draws on the ideas drawn from the concept
of ‘finalisation in science’ developed jointly with Wolfgang Krohn and Gernot Böhme,
which assumes indeterminacy of directions in science & technology developments (cf.
Schäfer, Böhme 1983). This point of departure allows him to notice alternative paths
for S&T development. Instead of a linear vision of progress, based, to some extent,
on technological determinism, we would be dealing with a ramified network of roads,
not necessarily leading to the same final destination. As far as risk is concerned, this
approach would allow us to choose the more favourable option and rush forward.
Wolfgang van den Daele argues that instead of rejecting risks and, consequently,
rejecting new technologies and maintaining the old, often more harmful ones, one
should seek less risky yet ‘progressive’ avenues. Therefore, instead of blocking S&T
developments by rejecting progress in biotechnology and continuously wrestling with
unsolved problems in areas such as health care or food production, one should,
through purposeful experiments, seek a ‘third road’ that would be free from the
risks of biotechnology while retaining its advantages. This kind of approach, however,
calls for a remodelled public policy in the sphere of science and technology. In the
present situation, dominated by the logic of free market, governments have a very
limited power over deciding how new technologies will be used and developed. Only
some technologies are regulated by governments (energy, telecommunications, road
systems) whereas the majority are ruled by supply and demand and must only meet
safety requirements. Also when it comes to setting the directions for new technologies,
governments have little influence in view of the privatisation of science which has led to
a situation where most pivotal technologies today are owned by private multinational
corporations of global reach.
While Arnoldi’s book does not directly invoke the aforementioned problems re-
sulting from the application of risk as a notion in scientific and non-scientific practice,
it nevertheless encourages reflection on those problems, offering ample material for
such pursuits. It is a pity, though, that the author has published another book with the
word ‘risk’ in the title, inadvertently reinforcing the trend of thinking about science
and technology in terms of this paradoxical and controversial category.
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